Belief and Meaning have often been thought to be intimately related. Typically, there is a correlation between the meaning of a sentence which is uttered and the content of the attitude that the speaker thereby conveys. This is also why the sentence can be used to specify this content in an attribution of the attitude to the speaker. From the perspective of a theory of semantic content, thus, there is a level of description where mental states and sentences can be said to share a content or meaning. Maybe, though, belief and (sentence) meaning have to be kept apart conceptually, theoretically, and methodologically. Thus it could be that meaning is an internalist notion which can be accounted for purely linguistically (or even non-intentionally altogether), while the same may not be true of belief. The volume brings together researchers from various areas in philosophy as well as linguistics to address these questions. Issues dealt with include the Davidsonian thesis of the necessary interlocking of belief and meaning, the naturalizability of intentional content in general, externalism versus internalism, the connection of meaning and grammar, the role of meaning in a general theory of inquiry, the normativity of meaning, and analyticity. Contributors are Akeel Bilgrami, Michael Esfeld, Wolfram Hinzen, Max Kölbel, Isaac Levi, Diego Marconi, James McGilvray, Olaf Müller, Paul Pietroski and Norbert Hornstein, Sebastian Rödl, and Alberto Voltolini.
 
Gebundene Ausgabe: 252 Seiten
Verlag: Hänsel-Hohenhausen
Sprache: Englisch
ISBN-10: 3826700252
ISBN-13: 9783826700255
Verpackungsabmessungen: 21,3 x 15,7 x 2 cm